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Mediating the Female Terrorist: Patricia Hearst and 
the Containment of the Feminist Terrorist Threat  
in the United States in the 1970s 
Amanda Third ∗ 
Abstract: »Die Medialisierung des weiblichen Terroristen: Patricia Hearst und 
die Eindämmung der feministischen terroristischen Bedrohung in den USA in 
den 1970er Jahren«. In January 1976, the trial of Patricia Campbell Hearst 
caused a Western media sensation. Representing the culmination of her spec-
tacular kidnapping and conversion to the terrorist cause of the Symbionese 
Liberation Army (SLA), Hearst was on trial for her participation in the Hibernia 
National Bank robbery almost two years earlier. As of the commencement of 
the trial, the story of the heiress-come-female-terrorist had been captivating 
Western media audiences for two years. This article analyses the ways that 
mainstream media coverage of this event operated to contain both the threat 
of this particular female terrorist, and the threat of second-wave feminism 
more broadly. Within Western culture, there has historically been a concern 
with the need to regulate the mainstream media’s coverage of terrorist events. 
In this line of thinking, the mainstream media are a precondition for, and a po-
tential site of the contagion of, terrorism. However, as I demonstrate, ultimate-
ly, mainstream media coverage of terrorist events in which women are key pro-
tagonists operates to recuperate the threat of terrorism. In doing so, it 
reproduces and reasserts dominant patriarchal gender relations and thus works 
in the interests of dominant culture, rather than against them. 
Keywords: Gender, female terrorist, media, terrorism, Patty Hearst, second-
wave feminism, United States. 
1.  Introduction 
Terrorism has unfortunately become a form of mass entertainment. 
Frederick J. Hacker (1983) 
Women terrorists have but recently begun to lay serious claim to the attention of 
scholars and practitioners […] Through the actions of a few extremely vicious ex-
amples, the world has come to the shocking, and almost certainly correct, realiza-
tion that, after all, the female of the species may well be deadlier than the male. 
H. H. A. Cooper (1979)  
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In January 1976, the New York Times reported on the international media 
crowd gathering in San Francisco to cover the Western news media event of 
the moment, the trial of Patricia Campbell Hearst:  
The Germans have come, the French, the Spanish, the English, the Swedes 
and the Australians […] Here is someone from The National Courier, a semi-
monthly publication in Plainfield, N.J., and someone from a weekly in Idaho. 
And there are reporters from virtually every large newspaper and television 
and radio station in the United States. Altogether, there are 300 to 400 repre-
sentatives of the news media here to cover the Patricia Hearst trial, to record 
for audiences around the world the latest episode in the story of the apparent 
newspaper heiress who was kidnapped and now must face a jury on a charge 
of bank robbery (Fosburgh 1976). 
Representing the culmination of her spectacular kidnapping and conversion to 
the terrorist cause of the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA), Hearst was on 
trial for her participation in the 1974 Hibernia National Bank robbery.1 As of 
the commencement of the trial, the story of the heiress-come-female-terrorist 
had been captivating Western media audiences for two years. This article anal-
yses the ways that mainstream media coverage of this event operated to contain 
both the threat of this particular female terrorist, and the threat of second-wave 
feminism more broadly.  
Within Western culture, there has historically been a concern with the need 
to regulate the mainstream media’s coverage of terrorist events. In this line of 
thinking, the mainstream media are a precondition for, and a potential site of 
the contagion of, terrorism. However, as I demonstrate, ultimately, mainstream 
media coverage of terrorist events in which women are key protagonists oper-
ates to recuperate the threat of terrorism. In doing so, it reproduces and reas-
serts dominant patriarchal gender relations and thus works in the interests of 
dominant culture, rather than against them. 
2.   Terrorist Contagion? The Media’s Relationship to 
Terrorism 
Debates over the definition and correct usage of the term terrorism have been 
tirelessly rehearsed within the literature of terrorism studies, a sub-discipline of 
political science that emerged in the 1970s, and which seeks to generate solu-
tions to the problem of terrorism that is thought to periodically afflict Western 
                                                             
1  Patricia Campbell Hearst was known as Patty Hearst in the mass media. However, Hearst has 
repeatedly insisted that she finds the public’s use of her shortened name overly familiar and 
presumptuous, and that she wishes to be known as Patricia. I have tried to abide by Hearst’s 
preference here, except where it is necessary to distinguish between Hearst and her parents; 
or Hearst’s two mediated personalities – Patty and Tania. 
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democracies. Yet, despite a vigorous debate over more than 35 years, the defi-
nitional problem still plagues academic, government and security industry 
scholarship. Nonetheless, there is general consensus within the literature of 
terrorism studies that the mainstream media and terrorists have a symbiotic 
relationship, the nexus of which is their complementary interest in audience 
maximization. For many commentators, it is terrorism’s desired outcome of 
affecting audiences – of conveying a message to, and inflicting psychic harm 
upon, a wider public – that is thought to mark terrorism as distinct from other 
forms of violence.  
For example, for Lawrence Zelic Freedman, terrorism is “the use of violence 
when its most important result is not the physical and mental damage of the 
direct victim but the psychological effect produced on someone else” (Freed-
man 1983, 3, my emphasis. See also Tuman 2003, 5; and Schmid and de Graaf 
1982, 15). Further, in an important 1982 book in which they were concerned 
primarily with explicating the role of the news media in disseminating terrorist 
messages to audiences, Alex P. Schmid and Janny de Graaf suggested that 
“without communication there can be no terrorism” (Schmid and de Graaf 
1982, 9). Like many other commentators on terrorism, Schmid and de Graaf 
argue that terrorism’s motives are primarily publicity-centered, and that their 
victims function merely as vehicles for terrorists to potentially proselytize large 
audiences to their cause. Conceiving terrorism as violence deployed for the 
purposes of propaganda, they argue that terrorism must be understood first and 
foremost as a communication practice, which  
does not murder to kill somebody but to obtain a certain effect upon others 
than the victim [...] The immediate victim is merely instrumental, the skin on a 
drum beaten to achieve a calculated impact on a wider audience […] For the 
terrorist the message matters, not the victim (Schmid and de Graaf 1982, 14).  
In this logic, the media provide the vital link between terrorists and their audi-
ences; they are a precondition for both the occurrence and the affective impacts 
of terrorism. 
This kind of analysis in turn produces a medium of commentary in which 
the media are, to varying degrees, causal of terrorism, and also the site of its 
potential containment. That is, in the search for so-called solutions to the prob-
lem of terrorism in the Western world, the media are often constructed as a 
locus for the containment and control of terrorism, leading to calls for the me-
dia in democratic societies to self-regulate. For example, in a speech to the 
American Bar Association in 1985, shortly after the high profile hijacking of 
TWA flight 847 and the murder of Navy SEAL, Robert Dean Stetham, Maggie 
Thatcher, then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, famously argued that 
“civilised societies” must respond to terrorism by taking “every possible pre-
caution to protect ourselves”, including “starv[ing] the terrorist […] of the 
oxygen of publicity on which they depend” (Thatcher 1985). Whilst Thatcher 
did not go as far to suggest that Western governments should impose censor-
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ship on the media’s coverage of terrorism, she advocated that the media “agree 
among themselves” to impose “a voluntary code of conduct […] under which 
they would not say or show anything which could assist the terrorists’ morale 
or their cause” (Thatcher 1985). In Thatcher’s formulation, Western democracies 
– what she describes as “civilised societies” – are particularly vulnerable to ter-
rorism because of their tolerance of political diversity and their commitment to 
the liberal ideal of a free press.2 Echoing Schmid and de Graaf’s analysis, her 
claim drew upon the Western dominant cultural idea that “the media is crucial to 
the success of terrorism” (Bassiouni 1983, 178) because it secures the access to 
audiences necessary to ensure terrorists their political message will be heard.  
Western world counterterrorist approaches since the 1970s have thus been 
dominated by an overriding concern about the role the mainstream media – and 
in particular, the news media – play in distributing the aberrant politics of 
terrorist organizations to Western audiences, and thereby, the capacity of the 
media to potentially undermine the legitimized politics underpinning dominant 
culture. That is, there has been a pervasive concern about the ways that the 
mainstream media might play into the terrorists’ hands and further their politi-
cal ends. In this register, terrorism operates to problematize the limits of the 
mainstream media’s role in informing the citizenry in liberal democratic na-
tion-states, raising questions about whose side the media is on and constructing 
them as a potentially subversive variable in the struggle to counter terrorism. 
Such assertions, however, rest upon the idea that audiences are merely the 
passive recipients of terrorists’ messages. They conceive of terrorism as a “vio-
lent communication strategy” that requires “a sender, the terrorist, a message 
generator, the victim, and a receiver, the enemy and/or the public” (Schmid and 
de Graaf 1982, 15). The power of the terrorist message derives from “the na-
ture of the terrorist act, its atrocity, its location and the identity of its victim” 
(Schmid and de Graaf 1982, 15). Schmid and de Graaf thus explain terrorism’s 
communicative dimensions in terms of the relatively straightforward transmis-
sion of information from senders to receivers – a conceptualization which falls 
within the theoretical frame of the transmission (McQuail 2000, 52-3) or pro-
cess model of communication (Schirato and Yell 1996, 1-21). In this model, 
audiences are affected by the mainstream media’s coverage of terrorist aims 
and practices in predictable and quantifiable ways, emphasizing an understand-
ing of communication in which the sender and the message are determinant of 
meaning.3 Thus, if the media are rendered potentially subversive in these for-
                                                             
2  Importantly, formulating terrorism in these terms presumes that terrorism is practised by 
small clandestine groups against democratic governments, producing the view that, as Her-
man and O’Sullivan claim, “whereas the West is continuously under siege from terrorism, 
the East is free from this scourge” (Herman and O’Sullivan 1989, 39). 
3  This model of communication has been a useful ally of the media effects tradition, which 
has historically sought to draw conclusions about audience responses to messages based on 
content analyses of media texts. 
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mulations, so too their audiences are rendered as overly malleable and vulnera-
ble to the seductions of terrorists. In short, the fear is that any publicity is good 
publicity for the terrorist cause. In this way, media coverage is configured as a 
mechanism of the contagion of terrorism, representing a site for the potentially 
widespread destabilization of the social and cultural order that underpins West-
ern liberal democratic nation-states. 
However, these claims about the power of media coverage of terrorism 
within Western culture – and in particular the claim that audiences comprise 
politically malleable subjects that are vulnerable to terrorists’ spectacular hi-
jackings of mainstream media spaces – requires further scrutiny. Since the 
1990s, in the context of the so-called cultural turn within media and communi-
cations theory, scholars have sought to address the limitations of the transmis-
sion model of communication and account for the processes by which audienc-
es actively make meanings from texts in their everyday lives (Seiter 1999, 9). 
This has sparked a re-valuation of qualitative methods of media and communi-
cations research directed towards the conditions and possibilities of audience 
reception (see for example Ang 1991). As Michel de Certeau states, “once the 
images broadcast by television and the time spent in front of the TV set have 
been analyzed, it remains to be asked what the consumer makes of these images 
and during these hours” (de Certeau 1988, 31). Whilst de Certeau is referring to 
the images that proliferate in consumer society more generally, his comments 
are equally relevant to the consumption of terrorist spectacle.  
To what extent, then, might audiences’ consumption of mainstream media 
representations of terrorism be implicated in the work of reproducing dominant 
social formations? In what ways do mainstream media representations work to 
contain the threat of terrorism, even though they may take the appearance of 
fuelling the publicity aims of terrorists?  
3.   Conceptualizing Terrorism 
Like many commentators, Ghassan Hage observes that terrorism circulates 
within the spaces of mainstream Western culture as “the worst possible kind of 
violence” (Hage 2003, 126; see also Jenkins 2003, 18). In order to understand 
how terrorism achieves this status, it is necessary to move beyond traditional 
understandings that constitute terrorism as objectifiable political violence to-
wards a more nuanced understanding of terrorism as symbolic violence – a 
form of communication that is embedded in a representational economy, and a 
practice that implicates audiences in the generation of affect.4 Terrorism, that 
                                                             
4  All forms of violence and criminality can be understood as forms of communication (see 
Bardsley 1987). However, in the case of terrorism, the communicative dimension is explicitly 
foregrounded. 
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embodiment of so-called absolute evil that we know intimately without neces-
sarily experiencing it as an immediate victim, is produced in and through dis-
course, “a culture’s determined and determining structures of representation 
and practice” (Terdiman 1985, 57). It is only in relation to discourse that terror-
ism can menace, whilst simultaneously assuming the appearance of an objec-
tive political truth. Like Giovanna Borradori, I would “deny that terrorism has 
any stable meaning, agenda, and political content” (Borradori 2003c, xiii). 
Instead, terrorism must be understood as the discursive effect of a communica-
tion process; a construct that is called into being via the complex negotiations 
between terrorists, audiences, sites of institutional power and texts. Important-
ly, then, the mainstream media constitute but one component of a network of 
relations governing the production of the meanings of terrorism in Western 
liberal democratic societies.  
Jacques Derrida has suggested, in relation to the attacks of September 11, 
2001, that terrorism presents in the cultural imagination as a “major event.” In 
making this claim, he draws upon Heidegger’s notion of the event as “a hap-
penstance that resists appropriation and understanding” (Borradori 2003b, 149). 
For Derrida, a major event is: 
That which in the undergoing or in the ordeal at once opens itself up to and re-
sists experience […] a certain unappropriability of what comes or happens […] 
The event is first of all that which I do not first of all comprehend. Better, the 
event is first of all that I do not comprehend (Derrida in Borradori 2003a, 90).  
Derrida argues that an act of terrorism presents with the quality of immediacy, 
manifesting as momentous, unforeseeable, and, ultimately unassimilable. He 
suggests that because terrorism produces a fundamental incomprehension, this 
produces attempts to bring the experience of terrorism within the realm of the 
knowable, to produce the terrorist act in ways that will contain the threat it 
poses (Derrida in Borradori 2003a, 90). Thus, in the aporia that opens up in the 
aftermath of a terrorist attack, Western dominant cultural responses to terrorism 
are characterized by the desire to subordinate the radically unfamiliar to a fa-
miliar and established regime of knowing. In this context, I argue, despite 
noisily rehearsed concerns to the contrary, media coverage operates in favor of 
dominant cultural interests.  
4.   The 1970s Discourse of Terrorism 
In 1981, Irving Louis Horowitz claimed that, within the United States over the 
course of the 1970s, a shift had taken place in the grammar of official politics 
that saw terrorism become “front and center in the political stage” (Horowitz 
1983, 38-9). Indeed, the 1970s saw the US government’s recognition that ter-
rorism was not the distant problem of foreign nations but one that increasingly 
threatened close to home. Anthony C. Quainton argues that in this very same 
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period terrorism “became part of America’s popular political vocabulary” 
(Quainton 1983, 53), highlighting that terrorism’s arrival in the vernacular 
occurred as the US government began to perceive itself as the victim of terror-
ism and mobilized the force of its institutional powers to contain the threat. We 
may read both Horowitz and Quainton as signaling the production of a new 
discourse on terrorism. Indeed, the 1970s mark an important moment in the 
history of the West’s conceptualization of the practice of terrorism because, 
during this era, the new discipline of terrorism studies institutionalized the 
study of this apparently novel and menacing political phenomenon. And this 
same discourse, articulated only slightly differently, structures our present day 
understandings of the practice of terrorism.5 As we shall see in a moment, this 
is the precise moment when the female terrorist first becomes a preoccupation 
for both counterterrorism and popular culture alike. 
In The ‘Terrorism’ Industry, Herman and O’Sullivan make a political econ-
omy argument about the ways terrorism has been mythologized and managed 
in the Western world, and in particular, in the US since the 1970s.6 They claim 
the ways terrorism articulates in the US imagination have been the product of a 
government public relations agenda that sells the nation’s foreign policy activi-
ties to citizens of the US and other Western nations alike. The “‘terrorism’ 
industry” is a constellation of government bodies, research institutes, and intel-
ligence and security organizations that cross public and private sector institu-
tions, which “manufactures, refines, and packages for distribution information, 
analysis, and opinion on a topic called ‘terrorism’” (Herman and O’Sullivan 
1989, 55). Together, the organizations comprising the “‘terrorism’ industry”: 
Establish policy and provide opinions and selected facts about official acts and 
plans on terrorist activity in speeches, press conferences, press releases, hear-
ings, reports, and interviews. [They also provide] risk analysis, personal and 
property protection, and training, and a body of terrorism ‘experts’ (Herman 
and O’Sullivan 1989, 55).  
As a set of institutions that collaborate in the production of scientific 
knowledge about terrorism, the terrorism industry is a key site in the produc-
tion of dominant discourse on terrorism. It produces the object of terrorism, 
                                                             
5  Many of the key scholars of terrorism studies that contributed to the production of 1970s 
discourse on terrorism have contributed to recent literature deployed to make sense of the 
events of September 11, 2001. For example, Laqueur, perhaps the pre-eminent scholar on 
terrorism, whose 1977 text, Terrorism, has been a touchstone for many analyses of terror-
ism, has recently published The New Terrorism (Laqueur 1999); History of Terrorism (Laqueur 
2001); No End to War (Laqueur 2004a); and Voices of Terror (Laqueur 2004b). See also Jen-
kins (2003), and Hoffman (1998). These scholars have also played an important role in advis-
ing governments about how to respond to terrorism in the new millennium. 
6  Here I distinguish between the traditional and critical political economy approaches. For an 
elaboration of the differences (see Golding and Murdock 1991).  
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governing the way that terrorism is meaningfully talked about and reasoned 
about within mainstream US culture. 
The framework of understanding provided by the terrorism industry works 
overwhelmingly in consonance with the interests of the state: “The analysts 
supplied by the private sector of industry, along with those working in govern-
ment, constitute the ‘experts’ who establish and expound the terms and agenda 
demanded by the state” (Herman and O’Sullivan 1989, 8; see also Zwerman 
1992). The high level of knowledge exchange between institutional powers 
means the information made available to the public is tightly controlled, narrow 
in focus, and echoes the interpretations of terrorism expounded by terrorism 
studies scholarship. In this context, Zwerman argues, “conservative ideologues 
[…] in the government, the courts, and the mainstream media” determine 
“what is ‘known’ about recent incidents of political violence and the back-
ground and motives of the individuals involved in these actions” (Zwerman 
1992, 134).  
Under the reign of mass media, the news media have historically been an 
important source of information about terrorism for public consumption and a 
crucial site for the reproduction of dominant discourse on terrorism.7 The news 
media rely heavily on expert opinion in their reporting of terrorist incidents, 
legitimizing the official line on terrorism: 
Most materials that appear in the media can be traced to a small number of of-
ficial agencies […] which enjoy a very high degree of credibility […] The 
news media generally treat this kind of official information as authoritative 
[…] The media often seem content to serve as the mouthpieces of the law en-
forcement bureaucracy (Jenkins 2003, 139).  
The reproduction of dominant discourse on terrorism via the mass media, how-
ever, is not restricted to news media representations. Terrorism is a fundamen-
tally intertextual phenomenon. As such, public perceptions of terrorism are 
formed in audiences’ interactions with a variety of representations of terrorism 
that circulate in both fictional – films, television, novels – and non-fictional – 
historical and true crime – texts. These texts reproduce stereotypical under-
standings of politically motivated violence and thus are equally important in 
shaping popular understandings of terrorism (Jenkins 2003, 150). Jenkins 
claims the products of the media-entertainment industries are heavily implicat-
ed, like the news media, in the production and circulation of discourse on ter-
rorism, and that the majority of these texts tend to reproduce terrorism in the 
safe terms of dominant discourse, re-inscribing the understandings of terrorism 
that emanate from the terrorism industry.  
                                                             
7  In the era of digital media, due to the rise of interactive media formations, this is arguably 
changing. Nonetheless, it is plausible that television, radio and newspaper coverage of ter-
rorism still plays an influential role in constructing the public’s perceptions of terrorism. This 
would constitute a productive line of future inquiry. 
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Both fictional and non-fictional popular cultural texts typically personify 
terrorism such that the demonized terrorist operates as shorthand for the de-
monization of terrorism more generally. Further, the terrorist is constructed 
quite narrowly and ahistorically as the origin of terrorism. As Jenkins suggests: 
The message from popular culture is that the problem [of terrorism] is chiefly 
the work of a handful of very evil individuals and understanding this menace is 
perhaps less difficult than comprehending the diverse factors (political, social, 
economic, spiritual) which drive the faceless terrorists of real life. Terrorism 
can thus be personalized in the form of Carlos, Colonel Qaddafi, or Osama bin 
Laden (Jenkins 2003, 151, my emphasis). 
Jenkins suggests that the personification of terrorism that we see in popular 
cultural texts simplifies terrorism for public consumption in a way that disa-
vows the situatedness of terrorism, dehistoricizing and depoliticizing it. Jenkins 
continues: 
There is little space in a film or novel for anything more than the sketchiest re-
flection of the […] background of a terrorist movement, the issues and griev-
ances driving it. Placing any emphasis on such social or political factors 
would undermine the simplistic struggle of good versus evil that so often pro-
vides the narrative framework of these stories (Jenkins 2003, 151). 
Zwerman also notes that the mainstream media frequently describe terrorist per-
petrators as “members of ‘fanatic’ left-wing, nationalist, or religious groups” 
targeting “property or citizens or officials who represent ‘free’, ‘democratic’, 
nations, as defined by the United States government” (Zwerman 1992, 134). 
Writing about news media representations of terrorism, Aida Hozic explains that 
reportage others the terrorist by depriving them of their human face and present-
ing terrorists out-of-context such that their actions seem “as distant and devoid of 
reason as a natural catastrophe” (Hozic 1990, 73). The terrorist that seizes the 
popular imagination is thus highly irrational – a monster devoid of reason and 
humanity – eliding the political contexts and aspirations motivating terrorism.  
Hozic notes that the spectacularization of terrorism within popular culture 
grants terrorists publicity, and as such, appears to fulfill terrorist aims. She 
writes, “the whole spectacular machinery gives terrorists an incredible and 
quite undeserved importance, publicity which they on their own could never 
dream of acquiring” (Hozic 1990, 73). However, as Hozic herself goes on to 
point out, this process of spectacularization ultimately works to underline the 
legitimacy of state power by “present[ing] terrorism in such a way that it 
start[s] working for and not against society” (Hozic 1990, 78).8 By focusing 
attention on the dehumanized and pathologized figure of the terrorist, and de-
historicizing and depoliticizing the terrorist’s actions, mainstream media cover-
                                                             
8  The kidnapping of Aldo Moro by the Italian Brigate Rosse in 1978 is one example of the 
ways this plays out (see Wagner-Pacifici 1986); see also Hof (2013). 
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age ultimately works to other and delegitimize the terrorist, to contain and 
annul the threat he – and by association, terrorism – poses. 
The ways terrorism circulates within mainstream culture are the legacy, 
then, of a discourse on terrorism that emerged in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, and which was profoundly shaped by the institutional knowledge pro-
duction of terrorism studies. It is precisely this moment in history when the 
female terrorist first became a preoccupation for governments, law enforcement 
agencies and popular culture more generally in the Western world. At this 
historical moment, women began to gain prominence in the so-called terrorist 
activities of a range of underground organizations operating in the West, such 
as the Weathermen and the Symbionese Liberation Army in the US, the Brigate 
Rosse in Italy, and the Rote Armee Fraktion in Germany. Thus, the institutions 
of Western culture began their project of delineating the specific threat of fe-
male terrorism, and the female terrorist became the subject of various forms of 
dominant cultural knowledge production, from counterterrorism, law enforce-
ment, and psychology to the news media, pulp fiction, and film.  
If mainstream media representations of terrorism have tended since the 
1970s to reproduce the legitimacy of dominant cultural formations, how are 
they implicated in the cultural work of reproducing the gender relations that 
underpin social order in the Western world?  
5.   Deadlier than the Male but not a Proper Terrorist: 
Representing the Female Terrorist 
The normative understandings of terrorism generated by the expert analyses of 
the “‘terrorism’ industry” and reproduced in popular cultural representations of 
terrorism construct the standard terrorist as male. As noted above, according to 
Jenkins, within the popular imagination, terrorism is personified by a range of 
masculine figures including Carlos the Jackal, Colonel Qaddafi, and Osama bin 
Laden; that is, the terrorist is almost exclusively a he. The use of the pronoun 
he to describe the terrorist constitutes an example of what Elizabeth Grosz 
describes as the more generalized invisibility of masculinity in Western culture, 
“the unspoken of the male body” (Grosz, cited in Naffine 1997, 8). As Susanne 
Greenhalgh notes, the qualities associated with terrorism are those that are gener-
ally associated with masculinity (Greenhalgh 1990, 161). In this sense, terrorism 
signifies not only violent resistance to established régimes of power by small 
clandestine operatives, but also as the mechanism of a dispute that is fundamen-
tally between men. In this kind of way, terrorism, claims Greenhalgh, is con-
structed as “a man’s game” (Greenhalgh 1990, 161). Given that the terrorist, and 
by extension, terrorism, signify as masculine, the female terrorist is positioned as 
a highly ambiguous figure within mainstream media representations.  
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As I have argued elsewhere, the female terrorist generates an excess of af-
fect in that she is thought to constitute a particularly pernicious threat to social 
order (Third 2006, 2014). The representational strategies mobilized to contain 
the female terrorist within the spaces of Western culture are fundamentally para-
doxical. Dominant discourse on the female terrorist is characterized by an (often 
irrational) excess of fear. On the one hand, she is constructed as an acutely vio-
lent and potent threat to social order – more radical, more subversive, and more 
violent than her male counterparts. Female terrorists are routinely constructed as 
highly motivated, excessively emotional beings with the capacity to commit the 
most heinous of crimes and show no remorse, and they are reportedly more diffi-
cult to rehabilitate.9 She is constructed, that is, not only as non-feminine but also 
as more terrorist than terrorist – as hyper-terrorist. On the other hand, however, 
the female terrorist is also written into dominant discourse as fundamentally 
emotional, incapable of divesting herself of her feminine propensity for passion-
inspired irrationality. Like the male terrorist, she is thought to suffer from a 
form of madness. However, her madness differs from that of the male terrorist in 
that it is a madness that is coded peculiar to women – a kind of hormonally driv-
en madness that is written into her biology.10 To construct the female terrorist in 
these ways operates to render her comprehensible within the range of culturally 
ascribed typical feminine behaviors. Indeed, within dominant discourse, the 
female terrorist represents the logical limit of these behaviors – she is a manifes-
tation of excessive femininity, she is hyperfeminine. She is thus at once hyperter-
rorist (and therefore non-feminine) and hyperfeminine. 
We can understand the paradoxical nature of the representation of the fe-
male terrorist as an effect of the female terrorist’s operation as what Lacan calls 
the “symptom”. As Lynda Hart explains, the symptom is a representational 
construct that marks the limits of any particular system, in this case the system 
of gender identity that underpins Western patriarchal order. The symptom is: 
Constitutively paradoxical, for it is an element at once necessary to any sys-
tem’s ability to constitute itself as a totality and the site that marks the sys-
tem’s instability. The symptom then both manifests and corrupts […] The 
symptom is what gives support to being; it is what allows a signifying system 
to appear consistent, and yet it is always in excess in that system, for it cannot 
be fully circumscribed within it (Hart 1994, 8). 
As symptom, the female terrorist operates to demarcate the category of femi-
ninity, enabling its production as a relatively stable and coherent category. 
Situated as Other to legitimized femininity, the female terrorist marks the limits 
of the system of gender identity. She is simultaneously outside, and necessary 
to (within) the significatory system of gender. However, her exclusion as Other 
also positions her as a threat to the system’s coherence. She is that which 
                                                             
9  These attitudes are documented in MacDonald (1991). 
10  For an exposition of this argument, see Georges-Abeyie (1983). 
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threatens from the borders, reminding the system of its fragility. She represents 
the system’s excess, and thus signifies as a site of instability and potential 
subversion. Indeed, the female terrorist threatens the possibility of representa-
tion itself. Positioned within the representational economy as the “inversion of 
an inversion” (Young 1996, 29) and in as much as she reminds the system of 
the contingency of its limits, the female terrorist represents a threat that must be 
obsessively contained.  
As we shall see, this impulse towards containment played out in relation to 
the kidnapping and conversion of Patricia Campbell Hearst by the SLA. 
6.   Nuclear (Family) Terrorists: Media Representations of 
the Kidnapping and Conversion of Patricia Campbell 
Hearst 
On the evening of 4 February 1974, the US experienced its first “political kid-
napping” (West and Belcher 1975, 25) when the left-wing SLA kidnapped 
Patricia Campbell Hearst in a violent attack on her home near the University of 
California’s Berkeley campus, beginning an ordeal that would see the US pub-
lic spellbound by an intense media spectacle that lasted for over two years. In 
the aftermath of her abduction, Hearst was held captive in a closet for a couple 
of months, subjected to a rigorous process of brainwashing11 and subsequently 
declared via a communiqué to the news media that she had decided to join the 
terrorist group in their fight against “the corporate enem[ies] of the people” 
(Morgan 2001, 189). Authorities treated this declaration with some degree of 
disbelief until Hearst was caught on security camera wielding a rifle in a bank 
robbery executed by SLA members in San Francisco. The event caused sensa-
tion, not only because the kidnapping was perceived to attack the heart of the 
US establishment, but also because, in announcing her new loyalty to the revo-
lution, Hearst vehemently denounced her family. Strong mainstream media 
speculation about the nature of Hearst’s involvement with the SLA continued 
until well after she was arrested and tried for bank robbery in early 1976. 
Patricia Hearst was a member of one of the most influential families in San 
Francisco’s Bay Area. Her father, Randolph (Randy) Hearst, was Chief Execu-
tive of the media empire inherited from Patricia’s millionaire grandfather, 
William Randolph Hearst, whose life inspired the film, Citizen Kane (1941). 
Patricia’s mother, Catherine Hearst, was the daughter of a wealthy family from 
Atlanta. At the time of Patricia’s kidnapping Catherine was a member of the 
University of California’s Board of Regents; a conservative body that imple-
                                                             
11  Brainwashing is the popular term for what is also known as coercive persuasion, thought 
reform or psychological reprogramming. See for example Lifton (1961). 
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mented several restrictive policies to curb the revolutionary activities of the 
student movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s. As a result of her position 
on this committee, Catherine had been the victim of a failed assassination at-
tempt in 1972.  
From the moment when Randy and Catherine Hearst presented themselves 
to the media on the steps of their Hillsborough mansion in San Francisco the 
morning after Patricia’s kidnapping, the Patty Hearst event was constructed by 
the mainstream news media as a breach against the nuclear family. Even before 
the SLA’s first taped communiqué was broadcast, the media, along with state 
representatives and the Hearsts themselves, unanimously began describing the 
20 year old Patricia in ways that positioned her as a member of a family; some-
times as a child but primarily as a daughter. Catherine appeared dressed in 
black, assuming the role of a mother grieving for her disappeared daughter, and 
newspaper reports were filled with stories detailing the kidnapping of Randolph 
Hearst’s daughter accompanied by sympathetic images of Randy, head bowed 
with fatherly concern. Media coverage of the Hearsts’ responses in the initial 
days of the Patty Hearst event thus constructed the abduction in terms of an 
attack on the Hearst family and, in so doing, their plea for the safety of their 
daughter tapped public sympathy by appealing to fears and concerns about the 
vulnerability of families more generally (see Boulton 1975, 82).  
As Hearst pointed out via a subsequent communiqué addressed to her par-
ents and sent to Californian media outlets, everyone was implicated in this 
attack: “This is a warning to everybody […] This is a political issue and this is 
a political action [the SLA] have taken” (Boulton 1975, 94-5, my emphasis). 
And it seems this breach hit a raw nerve with the wider US public. For exam-
ple, Jerry Belcher, a journalist for the San Francisco Examiner, with a daughter 
of similar age to Patricia, recalls going home the evening after the kidnapping 
and removing the nameplate from his family’s mailbox: “Silly, probably. But 
Randy Hearst never thought his daughter would be kidnapped either” (West 
and Belcher 1975, 35). David Boulton, too, notes that the event tapped the 
latent fears of every family (Boulton 1975, 9) but had an immediate impact in 
particular on upper class North American families (Boulton 1975, 82). As the 
case developed, Hearst came to signify, as Shana Alexander so aptly expresses 
it in the title of her account of the trial, “anyone’s daughter” (Alexander 1979). 
That is, the mainstream media constructed the event as an attack against all 
families, framing the event in ways that resonated with the structure of social 
relations underpinning and reproducing dominant cultural order through time.  
Situating Hearst’s kidnapping in relation to the nuclear family evidences the 
ways mainstream media coverage of this terrorist event operated to contain the 
threat of terrorism and reassert the conservative gender relations that underpin 
dominant cultural order. Luce Irigaray argues that the exchange of women 
forms the legitimate basis for relations among men, and as such, constitutes the 
“symbolic system” (Irigaray 1985, 173) that structures both the collective pro-
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cess of imagining society, and the relations between men, which, under patriar-
chy, comprise the social (Irigaray 1985, 171). For Irigaray, “women’s bodies – 
through their use, consumption and circulation – provide for the condition mak-
ing social life possible” (Irigaray 1985, 171). The exchange of a woman between 
two men is marked, argues Irigaray, by branding women with the “name-of-the-
father,” and this “determines their value in sexual commerce” (Irigaray 1985, 
31). Like all commodities, women’s value takes two forms: a use value, which 
for Irigaray is a reproductive value produced in relation to individual men’s 
desire in private; and an exchange value whose production is fundamentally 
social/public, carried out by, and between, men (Irigaray 1985, 31). Reading the 
SLA’s kidnapping of Patricia Hearst through Irigaray’s argument, at the level of 
dominant discourse, it threatened the socially legitimized exchange of women, 
and the social order it reproduces. In mainstream media accounts of the kidnap-
ping, Hearst was positioned as a commodity in a relationship of exchange be-
tween men in a “new form of illegitimate capitalism” (Alexander 1979, 11) that 
threatened the libidinal economy underpinning patriarchal order.  
In the first instance the SLA’s intention – declared via a series of communi-
qués to the mainstream news media – was to secure the release of their impris-
oned colleagues, Joseph Remiro and Russell Little, in exchange for the safe 
return of Hearst.12 However, when it became clear that the state would not 
capitulate to these demands, the SLA resorted to a different strategy. Unbe-
knownst to the outside world, they held Hearst hostage in a closet for almost 
two months, subjecting her to a rigorous process of thought reform, or brain-
washing, as it was commonly termed in mainstream media representations. 
Eventually, in a communiqué sent to the mainstream media on 3 April 1974, 
Hearst declared her decision to join the terrorist gang and fight for the revolu-
tion. For Hearst’s parents, representatives of the state and the Western audienc-
es who were watching, this moment in the Patty Hearst event marked the 
SLA’s possession of Patricia Hearst. The SLA marked their new possession as 
their own by renaming her Tania, after Che Guevara’s mistress.  
The Hearsts and the mainstream media responded to this breach of dominant 
gender relations with claims that Patricia had been coerced – drugged, hypno-
tized, tortured or, as Randolph Hearst stridently and publicly asserted, brain-
washed. In doing so, the mainstream media, and the US establishment more 
broadly, activated a long Western cultural tradition of essentializing women as 
emotional, malleable, irrational, and impulsive (See Lloyd 1993; Pateman 
1988; and Chesler 1989) in order to render Hearst’s behavior comprehensible 
and contain the meanings of the SLA’s terrorist breach. Further, it was assumed 
that Hearst’s decision to join the SLA was the mark of her sexual domination, 
and from this point on, Hearst became, for those involved, the illegally ac-
                                                             
12  Remiro and Little had been arrested for the murder of the first black Californian Superin-
tendent of Schools, Marcus Foster, on 10 January 1974.  
HSR 39 (2014) 3  │  164 
quired property of the SLA and her exchange value in legitimized relations 
between men was undermined. The mainstream media’s ongoing speculation 
that Hearst’s conversion could be attributed to her sexual domination by mem-
bers of the SLA reproduced conservative discourses of gender by insisting that, 
as a woman, Hearst could not have made this decision for political reasons but, 
rather, must have been seduced. That is, the mainstream media, at this stage in the 
Patty Hearst event, emphasized Hearst’s hyperfemininity. Thus, the mainstream 
media spectacle that ensued mobilized the idea that Randolph Hearst, as Patricia 
Hearst’s father, was therefore her rightful owner, reasserting the dominance of 
the nuclear family and the patriarchal structure of gender relations it implies. 
Such a reassertion of patriarchal gender structures was bolstered by recourse to 
longstanding cultural ideas about femininity that position women as irrational, 
prey to their passions and as an ever-present threat to gendered order – or what 
Rousseau termed “the disorder of women” (Pateman 1994, 108-19) – that re-
quires strategies of containment and control. As one newspaper article described 
it, Hearst was “a mentally unstable child, motivated by misguided political ideal-
ism” (Luce 1975, my emphasis). In this kind of way, rather than promoting the 
terrorists’ radical aims, mainstream media coverage of Hearst’s kidnapping oper-
ated primarily to reinscribe the gendering of dominant cultural order. 
7.   Feminist Terrorists and Terrorist Feminists: The Cross-
Wiring of the Terrorist Threat with Second-Wave 
Feminism 
If mainstream media representations of the kidnapping worked to contain the 
political challenge of the SLA by reasserting the value of the nuclear family 
and patriarchal gender relations, they also played into broader events shaping 
the US political and cultural landscape in the 1970s, evidencing the ways that 
mainstream media coverage of terrorism in democratic cultures can work to 
close down avenues of political contestation in times of perceived national 
crisis (Giroux 2004, 9).  
By all accounts, Hearst enjoyed all the comforts of an upper middle class 
upbringing and was considered by those around her as an exemplary young 
woman. However, while still at high school, Hearst fell in love with her young 
mathematics teacher, Steven Weed. When he accepted a teaching fellowship at 
the University of California’s Berkeley campus, she moved in with him, de-
spite not being married, and studied art history at the radicalized campus – 
decisions that her parents were less than enthusiastic about. On the request of 
her parents, shortly before Hearst was kidnapped, Patricia and Steven an-
nounced their engagement. In the aftermath of her very public denunciation of 
her family, and again when Hearst was finally arrested in 1976, Hearst’s histo-
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ry of minor revolt was disinterred by journalists seeking to locate Hearst’s con-
version within a familiar narrative about rebellious teenagers and deviant sexual 
experiences. That is, narratives emerged within the popular domain to explain the 
hyper-sexualized terrorist Tania that had proclaimed her love for her male revolu-
tionary comrade and her despise of bourgeois values and institutions, problema-
tizing the image of Hearst as an exchangeable woman, “a young woman who was 
living the American dream – born to a happy family, well educated, financially 
secure, and soon to be married” (Isenberg 2000, 656). 
The Hearst family responded to this public scrutiny of Patricia’s upbringing 
by releasing images from their family photo album for publication, attempting, 
as Nancy Isenberg notes: 
To reclaim Patty’s image through photographs that normalized her upbringing, 
publicly displaying snapshots from her seemingly unexceptional life […] Photo-
graphs of this kind capture images of happy families, but most importantly, the 
dignity of the family is reinforced by Patty’s carefully coded sexuality, which is 
contained through safe and normal images (Isenberg 2000, 651-2). 
The publication of the Hearsts’ family photos – images that ranged from First 
Communion to cheerleading shots – operated to locate Hearst within the nor-
mative framework of feminine sexuality, reinforcing the image of the integrity 
of the family,13 and, as such, dominant order. The photographs were used, 
literally, to construct the normalcy of Hearst’s female psychosexual develop-
ment in black and white truth-speaking terms. The photographs also worked to 
assert Hearst’s pedigree in proper socialization within the closely guarded 
structure of the nuclear family, a point that Randolph Hearst was keen to affirm 
when the shadowy gun-toting figure of Tania made her high-profile début: 
“We’ve had her for twenty years. They’ve had her 60 days, and I don’t believe 
that she is going to change her philosophy so quickly and permanently” (cited in 
Isenberg 2000, 655). Here, Randolph Hearst attempts to contain the subversive 
threat of Tania by asserting “his prior claim as the progenitor of her true identity” 
(Isenberg 2000, 655). The strength and durability of the family is produced dis-
cursively through the idea of socialization, which grounds the family within the 
structure of linear and routine time, granting it a sense of permanence. Nonethe-
less, as Isenberg suggests, “as a sign and commodity, Tania threatened the most 
basic beliefs of socialization” (Isenberg 2000, 655, my emphasis).  
This threat resonated with broader political and cultural threats to the nucle-
ar family that were gripping US culture in the 1970s; namely the threats posed 
by both the counterculture and second-wave feminism (also known as women’s 
emancipation or women’s liberation). As Shana Alexander writes, the SLA’s 
kidnapping of Hearst “was a family event occurring at a time when the family 
                                                             
13  The publication of these photographs privileged a narrative about the normalcy of the 
Hearsts’ family life and cut across the class divide that threatened to separate the Hearsts 
from potentially sympathetic audiences. 
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as an institution was in disunion and disrepair, when real families withered and 
shattered, and pseudofamilies thrived. The SLA itself was a pseudofamily” 
(Alexander 1979, 6). Indeed, by the mid-1970s in the US, the nuclear family 
was commonly perceived to be in crisis. The late 1960s and early 1970s wit-
nessed major transformations in civil society and a fundamental crisis in the 
power and legitimacy of the state. This overtly political and ideological chal-
lenge to liberal hegemony was unleashed by the younger generation, who were 
determined not just to refashion society, but to dismantle the institutional and 
ideological matrix that sustained it and to construct an alternative, utopian 
society in its place.  
Riding on the crest of the civil rights movement, the peace movement and 
the free speech movement, all of which gained considerable momentum on the 
radicalized university campuses, droves of young people dropped out and 
turned to the counterculture. This was perceived in the mainstream media as a 
significant political threat; a failure in the socialization of the younger genera-
tion. As one newspaper article stated: “We deceive ourselves if we fail to see 
that the counter-culture thrust is not towards reform, or even social revolution. 
It is towards terror and nihilism, violence and anarchy. Its impact upon Ameri-
can youth is not receding – it is growing” (Luce 1975). The counterculture 
promoted a kind of voluntary ghettoization; a policy of non-participation in 
mainstream society and the creation of an alternative society based on new 
patterns of living, family and (non)work (the countereconomy) (Clarke et al. 
1976, 62). The counterculture’s rejection of bourgeois values and social for-
mations included a critique of the nuclear family as an instrument of hegemon-
ic socialization. It sought to destabilize the hegemonic nuclear family by reject-
ing monogamy and promoting communal living arrangements.14 
The sense of the-family-in-crisis was further fuelled by the rising momen-
tum of the women’s liberation movement. As Sara Evans notes, “although 
women’s liberation was shocking and alienating to many, especially as seen 
through the lens of a hostile media” (Evans 1979, 221-2), women’s liberation 
was asserting itself as a formidable force for social change, and impacting the 
sphere of everyday cultural politics: 
By 1975 a new sense of rights and possibilities had led women to assert their 
belief in equal rights and opportunities for females in greater numbers and 
with greater intensity than men. Within the context of such massive shifts of 
opinion, as millions of women readjusted their view of themselves and of the 
world, many thousands also moved to activism and into the burgeoning wom-
en’s movement […] The issue of sexual equality had become a subject of din-
ner conversation in households across the nation (Evans 1979, 221-2). 
                                                             
14  Many women embraced the counterculture as an opportunity to explore alternative modes 
of organizing everyday life that encompassed feminist ideals. However, the counterculture 
did not necessarily translate into more congenial circumstances for women – indeed, often 
to the contrary. 
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This was reflected in, and bolstered by, significant legislative gains master-
minded by institutional feminists of organizations such as the National Organi-
zation of Women (NOW) – including the Equal Rights Amendment in 1972, 
followed quickly by the US Supreme Court’s 1973 legalization of abortion 
(Faludi 1991, 233). US attitudes towards the fairer sex began to undergo a 
paradigm shift, manifesting in, for example, new modes of speech – such as 
Ms, chairperson, and congressperson – and novel conceptions of advertising’s 
female target audience. Of the various forms of actions popularized by wom-
en’s liberation, radical feminism15 often opted for “guerrilla theatre” to draw 
mainstream media attention to their political message, or what the Yippies16 
called the “theatre of the apocalypse” (Raskin 1998, 220). For example, at “the 
Miss America demonstration of August 1968 […] young women crowned a 
live sheep to symbolize the beauty pageant’s objectification of female bodies, 
and filled a ‘freedom trashcan’ with objects of female torture – girdles, bras, 
curlers, issues of Ladies Home Journal” (Evans 1979, 213-4).17 Like their 
terrorist counterparts, then, through their staging of media spectacles, radical 
feminists seized widespread public attention. As Echols notes, the Miss Ameri-
ca Beauty Pageant protest “marked the end of the movement’s obscurity be-
cause the protest […] received extensive press coverage” (Echols 1989, 93). 
Second-wave feminism had thus begun to stake a sizeable claim on the “mind 
share” (Klein 2001) of North Americans, paving the way for the mainstreaming 
of feminist ideas and practices (Gerhard 2001, 152).18  
Beginning with the publication of Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique, 
second-wave feminists of different persuasions critiqued women’s subordina-
tion via their confinement within the domestic realm and the nuclear family. 
For example, Valerie Solanas’ sharp critique of patriarchal society condemned 
“a ‘society’ based on the family” that “unscrupulously violat[es] the female’s 
rights, privacy, and sanity (Solanas 2004, 46-8). And Shulamith Firestone 
                                                             
15  From the late 1960s through to the mid-1970s, radical feminism was the dominant activist 
paradigm shaping the women’s liberation movement in the United States. Opposed to the 
liberal feminist agenda of groups such as the National Organization of Women (NOW), 
which argued for women’s equality within the system, radical feminism proposed the over-
throw of the system (see Echols 1989). 
16  Echols notes: “The Youth International Party (or Yippie) was formed in December, 1967 and 
functioned primarily as a vehicle for Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin, two Movement activ-
ists who delighted in offending middle class sensibilities. “Their guerrilla theatre actions 
were not designed to raise the consciousness of average Americans whose ‘straightness’ put 
them beyond the pale as much as they were calculated to capture time on network news 
programs” (Echols 1989, 76). 
17  This is the event that inspired the widespread myth of feminist bra burning, even though 
feminists did not set any undergarments on fire.  
18  Radical feminist activism in particular had given rise to a significant underground press that 
helped to distribute the feminist message widely and in a way not possible via mainstream 
media outlets which, in general, remained hostile to feminist ideas and practices. 
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advocated undoing “the link between families and reproduction, a link that 
depended on women” (Gerhard 2001 97). And radical feminists conceived and 
popularized the practice of consciousness-raising (known as CR) as one that 
could politicize women by educating them in the fundamental oppressions at 
the heart of personal and ordinary life. Its methodology consisted of women’s 
discussion groups, designed to facilitate the recasting of women’s experiences 
of personal problems as “social issues fought together rather than with personal 
solutions” (Echols 1989, 93). Radical feminists thus took the feminist struggle 
to the heart of everyday cultural practices, calling for women’s negation of the 
everyday roles they inhabited, and in particular, the refusal of the gendering of 
the routines prescribed by the operation of the nuclear family and the domestic.  
Second-wave feminism’s growing popularity was greeted in the mainstream 
media by fierce condemnation – what Susan Faludi describes as a “backlash” 
(Faludi 1991) – particularly from the New Right, which excoriated women’s 
liberationists for their attempts to “restructur[e] the traditional family, and […] 
downgrad[e] the male or father role in the traditional family” (Paul Weyrich, 
cited in Faludi 1991, 232). Whilst the New Right protested most loudly, it by 
no means had a monopoly on anxieties about feminism. As Susan Faludi sug-
gests, “the mainstream would reject [the New Right’s] fevered rhetoric and 
hellfire imagery, but the heart of their political message survived” (Faludi 
1991, 230) in mainstream media representations.19 
At the same time, the threat of second-wave feminism began to be discur-
sively crosswired with the threat of “home-grown terrorism” (Zwerman 1992, 
140) in the US. As noted above, the female terrorist becomes a preoccupation 
within the specific criminological field of terrorism studies, and within domi-
nant culture more generally, at the precise moment when home-grown terror-
ism – terrorism carried out by US citizens on US soil – begins to be perceived 
as a threat to dominant order. This moment is simultaneous with the rise in 
strength and consolidation of women’s liberation in the US. In the period under 
question, proponents of terrorism studies repeatedly draw attention to the coin-
cidence of the rise of second-wave feminism and a seemingly dramatic increase 
in numbers of women participating in terrorism.20 In so doing, they establish an 
explicit connection between the rise of feminist politics and the occurrence of 
                                                             
19  A notable example of this in the cultural sphere was the release of the 1975 film, Stepford 
Wives, directed by Bryan Forbes (London: Cinema Club, 1997, VHS video). This film can be 
read as a backlash against the crisis in the gender relations underpinning the nuclear family 
that was brought on by the consolidation of feminism in the mid-1970s. See Stratton 
(1996, 224). 
20  This concern about women’s involvement in terrorism unfolded against the backdrop of a 
broader criminological concern with what was perceived as a significant rise in women’s 
perpetration of, and prosecution for, ‘violent crimes.’ Whether or not prosecutions of wom-
en committing violent and/or terrorist crimes increased in the 1970s is debatable. See Simon 
and Sharma (1979, 392).  
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terrorism in the US. Indeed, a number of these so-called experts construct a 
commitment to feminism, however loosely defined, as a necessary precondition 
for women’s participation in revolutionary terrorism. 
Counterterrorist scholar, H. H. A. Cooper’s 1979 description illustrates this 
point: 
The female terrorist has not been content just to praise the Lord and pass the 
ammunition; she has been, as often as not, the finger on the trigger […] This 
new woman revolutionary is no Madame Defarge patiently, if ghoulishly, 
knitting beside the guillotine while waiting for heads to roll. The new breed of 
female terrorist not only must have its hands firmly on the lever but must be 
instrumental in the capture of the victim and in the process of judgment, as 
well as in dragging the unfortunate death instrument (Cooper 1979, 151). 
Discernible here is a preoccupation with the shift in the balance of gendered 
power relations produced by the struggle for women’s liberation in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. Cooper alludes to the influence of feminist ideals of 
equality and emancipation on women’s roles in the left-wing terrorist organiza-
tions of the era. The assumption is that the actions of female terrorists are in-
formed by feminist ways of being.  
Such assertions also underpin the logic of popular cultural representations of 
female terrorism of the era.21 Eileen MacDonald observes that mass media 
representations of female terrorists invariably ask: “‘How could a woman do 
this?’ The answer […] seemed to be that they were all […] feminists gone 
mad” (MacDonald 1991, 5). Terrorism, so the popular mythology goes, is the 
refuge of women with feminist informed aspirations for self-determination, and 
terrorist organizations provide a commodious environment for the avid – or 
perhaps more precisely, the extreme – feminist. The female terrorist thus repre-
sents “one of the excesses of women’s lib” (German Interior Ministry Official, 
cited in MacDonald 1991, 6) – the unsettling threat of feminism. 
Indeed, evidencing the discursive interdependencies of the mainstream me-
dia and the “‘terrorism’ industry”, the SLA was commonly constructed in the 
mainstream media as a feminist revolutionary terrorist organization. Although 
ostensibly led by a black man (Cinque), at the time of Hearst’s kidnapping, the 
                                                             
21  Feminists have sometimes articulated similar ideas about the connections between feminism 
and female terrorism. Whilst feminist readings don’t go as far to suggest that feminism 
might have been the direct cause of female terrorism, the idea that women’s participation 
in terrorism is linked to the spirit of female emancipation is a subtext of a number of femi-
nist analyses. See, for example, Mullaney (1983, 55). Feminist commentaries express an am-
bivalence towards the figure of the female terrorist. She has sometimes been celebrated by 
feminists. For example, Valerie Solanas was considered an inspiration by many radical femi-
nists in the late 1960s (see Third 2014). At other points in history feminists have been reluc-
tant to validate the female terrorist’s violent methods, and have been keen to assert female 
terrorists as victims (as opposed to perpetrators) of patriarchal forms of violence (See Mor-
gan 1979). 
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SLA comprised predominantly female cadres.22 Media coverage frequently 
asserted that “women are the dominant force, the leadership of the Symbionese 
Liberation Army” (Reporter, Marilyn Baker as cited in Barry 1984, 155) and 
that they are “a regiment of women – two of whom [a]re known to be lovers – 
using Cinque as a figurehead to carry out their plans” (Davidson 1974). Whilst 
the implementation of feminism within the everyday life of this terrorist family 
appears to have been, at best, limited (see Hearst 1982), the women of the SLA 
– among them two self-identified lesbians – publicly constructed their com-
mitment to revolutionary terrorism as a form of feminist revolution, and their 
actions were heavily informed by radical feminist theorizations and tactical 
warfare (Isenberg 2000, 642). For example, the SLA, like many other radical 
groups of the era, operated on principles of free love and open sexual relations as 
a deliberate strategy aimed at destabilizing the structure of the bourgeois family. 
Thus, the SLA’s appropriation of Hearst both resonated with fears about the 
stability of the nuclear family that are a permanent feature of modernity, and 
foregrounded the threat to the family implicit in second-wave feminism. 
If Hearst’s abduction was interpreted in the mainstream media as a feminist 
attack, then, even more so, was the heiress’ transformation into Tania. Just two 
days after her debut performance in the Hibernia National Bank robbery, in the 
same stunning audiotape communiqué that denounced her family and declared 
her allegiance to the SLA, Tania also announced her feminist awakening. In-
sisting that speculation that she had been brainwashed was “ridiculous to the 
point of being beyond belief” (transcript of audiotape cited in Linder, 2007), 
she lashed out at the men associated with her former identity and, in particular, 
her ex-fiancée. As a New York Times article noted, gesturing the ways the Patty 
Hearst event was crosswired with the rising challenge to dominant culture 
posed by second-wave feminism:  
In her good-by [sic] tape, Patty said she had discovered a new kind of love. 
She told Steven Weed: ‘I’ve changed, grown. I’ve become conscious and can 
never go back to the life we led.’ (In how many homes across the country re-
cently has a woman delivered that message?) (Davidson 1974). 
Tania publicly proclaimed (radical) feminist solidarity via the mainstream 
media until she underwent pre-trial psychological testing;23 for example, fol-
                                                             
22  The SLA had formed out of a black inmate visitation scheme known as Venceremos run by 
left-wing radical activists at California’s Vacaville Prison in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
The only black member of the SLA, Donald DeFreeze (Cinque) became its titular leader after 
his escape from prison in March 1973. In addition to Cinque, the SLA comprised two men 
and, when ‘Tania’ joined them, five women. 
23  On the impact of Hearst’s pre-trial psychological testing, antipsychiatrist, Thomas Szasz 
notes: “Between the time of her arrest, when she identified herself as an urban guerrilla, 
and her appearance in court as a demure and dutiful daughter, Patty Hearst was no doubt 
influenced by her new captors and associates: no one calls this brainwashing” (Szasz 1976, 
11). 
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lowing her arrest in 1975, images of Hearst giving “her clenched fist ‘loyalty’ 
salute to what she calls ‘revolutionary feminism’” (Reston 1975) were splashed 
across the print media. As such, to the outside world, Tania sounded more and 
more like the product of an intensive experience of feminist consciousness-
raising.24 In light of her repeated claims to have become a revolutionary femi-
nist, speculation about Hearst’s brainwashing was revived, and assumed new 
dimensions. In the context of radical feminism’s gathering momentum, de-
pendent as it was in no small part upon the significant successes of feminist 
consciousness-raising, for mainstream media audiences, Hearst’s problem, it 
seemed, was that she had succumbed to a process of feminist brainwashing. 
Hearst’s was thus a dual betrayal – she had defected to a terrorist group but, 
worse, to a feminist terrorist group; a terrorist family in the control of feminist 
women. As such, the mainstream media’s coverage of the Patty Hearst event 
reproduced the dominant cultural idea that female terrorists are “feminists gone 
mad” (MacDonald 1991, 5). 
8.   Conclusion 
Patty Hearst was kidnapped in 1974, just as the feminist challenge began to con-
solidate and translate into concrete changes in the material conditions of women’s 
lives across the US. By the time Hearst was tried in 1976, the success of feminist 
legal and institutional reform, along with the significant, well-documented and 
highly publicised changes in cultural attitudes towards women, had begun to be 
met by the forces of a fervent and moralistic anti-feminist backlash. Second-wave 
feminism was constituted as a dire threat to the political, economic, and cultural 
survival of the US. In this context, the Patty Hearst event presented a timely 
opportunity for feminism’s adversaries to mount their own campaign for the 
reassertion of the primacy of the nuclear family and, by extension, social order, 
and to thwart the growing momentum of the women’s movement.  
Thus, the Patty Hearst event – in which a daughter of the dominant class be-
came a daughter of the revolution – was framed by mainstream media coverage 
as an assault on US social and cultural order emanating from, and resonating 
with, the crisis in the nuclear family. It constituted a site where competing 
definitions of the family and anxieties about the failure of the socialization of 
the younger generation played out. At a time when pseudofamilies seemed as if 
they were growing in number and might eventually outweigh the morally sanc-
tioned bourgeois institution of the nuclear family – when radical feminists, 
                                                             
24  Indeed, during her trial, recalling the mechanized women of Stepford Wives, one male juror 
commented, “we don’t really know what she’s like, whether we were looking at a live girl or 
a robot” (as cited in Isenberg 2000, 664). Tania, it seemed, was a feminist automaton and 
not, as she might seem, a real girl. 
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alongside organizations like the SLA, the Manson gang (see Bugliosi and Gen-
try 1975), and Jim Jones’ family of the People’s Temple were actively chal-
lenging the validity of the nuclear family – mainstream media coverage of the 
Patty Hearst event performed the cultural work of reproducing dominant social 
formations. It operated to recuperate the specific threat posed to dominant order 
by Tania and the SLA, but also worked to discursively contain the threat to the 
gender relations underpinning social order in the US that was being posed by 
second-wave feminism. In this way, rather than a mechanism for the contagion 
of terrorism, mainstream media coverage of this event operated overwhelming-
ly in favor of dominant cultural (patriarchal) interests. 
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